Menoeceus 124-127

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[edit] Translation

Accustom yourself to thinking that death is no concern to us. All things good and bad are experienced through sensation, but sensation ceases at death. So death is nothing to us, and to know the truth of this makes a mortal life happy -- not by adding infinite time, but by removing the desire for immortality. There is no reason why one who is convinced that there is nothing to fear at death should fear anything about it during life. And whoever says that he dreads death not because it’s painful to experience, but only because it’s painful to contemplate, is foolish. It is pointless to agonize over something that brings no trouble when it arrives. So death, the most dreaded of evils, is nothing to us, because when we exist, death is not present, and when death is present, we do not exist. It neither concerns the living nor the dead, since death does not exist for the living, and the dead no longer exist.

Most people, however, either dread death as the greatest of suffering or long for it as a relief from suffering. One who is wise neither renounces life nor fears not living. Life does not offend him, nor does he suppose that not living is any kind of suffering. For just as he would not choose the greatest amount of food over what is most delicious, so too he does not seek the longest possible life, but rather the happiest. And he who advises the young man to live well and the old man to die well is also foolish – not only because it’s desirable to live, but because the art of living well and the art of dying well are the same. And he was still more wrong who said it would be better to have never been born, but that “Once born, be quick to pass through the gates of Hades!” {Theognis, 425 - 427} If he was being serious, why wasn’t he himself quick to end his life? Certainly the means were available if this was what he really wanted to do. But if he was joking, then we have even less reason to believe him.

[edit] Analysis

Following the same order as the Four-Part Cure, Epicurus proceeds from the discussion of the gods to that of death. This passage echoes and elaborates, reiterated in various phrasings, the basic principle stated in Principal Doctrine 2. Epicurus buttresses his main argument by enumerating several benefits enjoyed by those who hold correct views regarding death, as opposed to those who suffer from their own, incorrect views.

Those who understand that death is "nothing to us"

• enjoy life, knowing full well that it is not endless, as they are mortal; no, their candid acceptance of their own mortality has not "added infinite time" to their natural life-span, but

• they have no vain expectations of immortality (which would have otherwise nagged them incessantly). Such expectations, as Epicurus elaborates in discussing the desires, lead people to make all sorts of poor choices in their lives.

• Thus they have realized that there is nothing all that terrible in life, once they understood that there is nothing terrible in death: fear of death is what casts a pall over life.

Quite on the contrary, the mataioi, those who hold vain, erroneous beliefs, suffer all sorts of anxieties. They make numerous misjudgments:

• They claim that, even if death will not hurt them when it comes, the very thought of it saddens them, as it will eventually come. But if something is painless then, why should it be painful now?

• They dread death as the most horrible event that can ever befall them; that is doubly unwise, because death is of course both inevitable and painless. But what is the benefit of trying to avoid what is inevitable, or the logic of dreading what is painless?

• In the height of their anxiety, they sometimes come to wish for death, or even commit suicide, as if death were some relief from all the sufferings of life. But does it really make sense to jump into the fire, if one is mortally afraid of fire?

Epicurus continues by sharpening this antithesis, juxtaposing the Sage and the Fool.

The Sage

• neither commits suicide,

• nor thinks there is anything terrible about death.

Epicurus colors his argument with a beautifully apt analogy: a reasonable person does not choose to eat the absolute most food one can hold, but the one that tastes best. Similarly, one should not strive to live the absolute longest time, vainly craving immortality, but one should instead enjoy one's finite lifetime the most one can, with as much pleasure as possible, and without fear.

Other than the Sage, however, people can be, and are in fact rather foolish.

• Some advise the young to live well, and the old to die well. But that runs contrary to the universal sense that life is dear; why should an old person love his/her life any less than a young one? Besides, knowing how to live well and to accept death is not two, separate "arts", but one and the same: acceptance of death as ouden pros hemas is what makes life pleasant.

• The radical pessimist who claims that "it is better either to never be born or, once born, to die as soon as possible" is either a hypocrite or an utter fool: if he truly thinks so, he could go ahead and commit suicide, since the means to terminate one's own life are readily available; if, on the other hand, he makes such moribund assertions lightly, he does so foolishly, as life and death are no joking matters. Only a hypocrite does not practice what he preaches, while only a fool does not comprehend the seriousness of a life-or-death decision.