Menoeceus 128-130

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Translation

For this reason, we declare that pleasure is the beginning and end of the happy life. We are endowed by nature to recognize pleasure as the first and familiar good. Every choice and avoidance we make is guided by pleasure as our standard for judging the goodness of everything.

Although pleasure is the greatest good, not every pleasure is worth choosing. We may instead avoid certain pleasures when, by doing so, we avoid greater pains. We may also choose to accept pain if, by doing so, it results in greater pleasure. So while every pleasure is naturally good, not every pleasure should be chosen. Likewise, every pain is naturally evil, but not every pain is to be avoided. Only upon considering all consequences should we decide. Thus, sometimes we might regard the good as evil, and conversely: the evil as good.

Analysis

After subdividing the desires and their corresponding desiderata into his three categories, Epicurus proceeds with a core discussion of pleasure, the cornerstone of hedonistic ethics, and the one attribute of the sentient human being that Epicurus holds to be innate, and thus self-evident. Epicurus posits pleasure as both the starting point and the end-goal of a happy life: it is where we begin all our deliberations, by judging the various choices and avoidances available to us according to the criterion of pleasure; it is the final outcome of exercising critical judgment in this manner, as it leads in circular, self-fulfilling manner to a life of pleasure.

Epicurus is, however, deeply scrupulous about the application of the "pleasure principle", as he is cautious to warn against a possible, and even likely misunderstanding of his teaching as license for mindless, ad hoc pleasure-seeking. Prudent hedonism --the kind Epicurus taught-- sometimes requires that we contravene the immediate urge to seek pleasure and avoid pain as they stand before as as choices of the moment: if current gratification could lead to greater pain later (e.g. a drinking binge, and the hangover next day), it is best to shun the pleasure that lies before us; if a greater pleasure could accrue later (e.g. feeling agile and healthy after exercising), it is best to endure the strain and fatigue of a rigorous physical regimen. Thus the application of the pleasure-principle has to be "double-tested" against the requirement of duration. Besides, as per the admonition of the fourth item of the Four-Part Cure, it is not difficult to endure such self-imposed "pain".

The fact that pleasure, and thus the instinctive pursuit of it is innate in us, does not necessarily mean that each and every ad hoc pleasure should be pursued. A prudent person, who can deliberate rationally, applies the further requirement of a pleasure's duration before opting for or against it. The same principle (albeit, of course, inversely) applies to pain: although we are instinctively predisposed to abhor it, we accept it when it is brief, and the pleasurable after-effect superior.

Thus Epicurus outlines the basic mechanism of his hedonistic ethics as a sort of cost-benefit analysis: despite the superficial paradox of a hedonist speaking against pleasure and in favor of pain, Epicurus makes a logically compelling case for the fundamental tenet of his philosophy, the necessary and sufficient correlation of pleasure and prudence, lauded eloquently in Menoeceus 132.