Menoeceus 133-135

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Ἐπεὶ 


  

τίνα 


Whom (then)  

νομίζεις 


(do) you consider  

εἶναι 


to be  

κρείττονα 


better  

τοῦ 


than the [one who believes piously]  

καὶ 


  

περὶ 


regarding  

θεῶν 


the gods  

ὅσια 


  

δοξάζοντος 


  

καὶ 


and [the one who is fearless]  

περὶ 


regarding  

θανάτου 


death  

διὰ 


  

παντὸς 


[once and for] all  

ἀφόβως 


  

ἔχοντος 


  

καὶ 


and [the one who has considered rationally]  

τὸ 


the [end-goal]  

τῆς 


  

φύσεως 


of nature  

ἐπιλελογισμένου 


  

τέλος, 


  

καὶ 


and [understands that the limit]  

τὸ 


  

μὲν 


  

τῶν 


  

ἀγαθῶν 


of goods  

πέρας 


  

ὡς 


  

ἔστιν 


is  

εὐσυμπλήρωτόν 


easy to complete  

τε 


  

καὶ 


and  

εὐπόριστον 


easy to acquire  

διαλαμβάνοντος, 


  

τὸ 


  

δὲ 


while [the limit]  

τῶν 


  

κακῶν 


of evils  

ὡς 


  

 


  

πόνους 


  

ἔχει 


has  

βραχεῖς; 


(merely) brief [pains?]  

τὴν 


  

δὲ 


Or [the one who scoffs fate]  

ὑπό 


(which is) [introduced] by  

τινων 


some  

δεσπότιν 


(as the) mistress  

εἰσαγομένην 


  

πάντων 


of all?  

ἐγγελῶντος 


  

<εἱμαρμένην; 


  

οὗτος 


(Such a man is best of all)  

γὰρ 


because  

ἑαυτὸν 


  

παρέχει 


he holds [himself accountable]  

τῶν 


  

πραχθέντων 


for (his own) actions  

ὑπεύθυνον, 


  

 


[claiming that] some (things) [happen]  

μὲν 


  

κατ’ 


by  

ἀνάγκην 


necessity  

γίνεσθαι 


  

τιθέμενος,> 


  

 


some  

δὲ 


  

ἀπὸ 


  

τύχης, 


by chance  

 


[while] others  

δὲ 


  

παρ’ 


by  

ἡμᾶς, 


our own actions  

διὰ 


because  

τὸ 


  

τὴν 


  

μὲν 


  

ἀνάγκην 


necessity [is]  

ἀνυπεύθυνον 


not accountable (to anyone)  

εἶναι, 


  

τὴν 


  

δὲ 


  

τύχην 


fortune (is)  

ἄστατον 


unstable  

ὁρᾶν, 


to discern  

τὸ 


  

δὲ 


while [that which happens]  

παρ’ 


by  

ἡμᾶς 


our own actions (is)  

ἀδέσποτον, 


independent  

 


from which [also follows naturally]  

καὶ 


  

τὸ 


(the judgment of) what is  

μεμπτὸν 


reprehensible  

καὶ 


and  

τὸ 


  

ἐναντίον 


what is commendable  

παρακολουθεῖν 


  

πέφυκεν. 


  

ἐπεὶ 


  

κρεῖττον 


[It would be] better  

ἦν 


  

τῷ 


[to believe in myths]  

περὶ 


about  

θεῶν 


the gods  

μύθῳ 


  

κατακολουθεῖν 


  

 


than  

τῇ 


[to be a slave] to the [Fate]  

τῶν 


of the  

φυσικῶν 


Natural Philosophers  

εἱμαρμένῃ 


  

δουλεύειν· 


  

 


  

μὲν 


[because] (he who believes in myths)  

γὰρ 


  

ἐλπίδα 


[subscribes to] (some) hope  

παραιτήσεως 


of relief (from ills)  

ὑπογράφει 


  

θεῶν 


[by honoring] the gods  

διὰ 


  

τιμῆς, 


  

 


while [fate]  

δὲ 


  

ἔχει 


(holds out no hope but is mere)  

τὴν 


  

ἀνάγκην. 


necessity  

τὴν 


  

δὲ 


(As such a wise man) [considers that]  

τύχην 


fortune (is)  

οὔτε 


neither  

θεόν, 


(a) god  

ὡς 


as  

οἱ 


the  

πολλοὶ 


many  

νομίζουσιν, 


believe  

ὑπολαμβάνων, 


  

οὐθὲν 


[because] nothing  

γὰρ 


  

ἀτάκτως 


  

θεῷ 


  

πράττεται, 


is done [by god in a disorderly manner]  

οὔτε 


nor  

ἀβέβαιον 


(some) uncertain  

αἰτίαν, 


cause  

οὐκ 


  

οἴεται 


he [does not] believe that  

μὲν 


  

ἀγαθὸν 


(some) good  

 


or  

κακὸν 


evil  

ἐκ 


  

ταύτης 


[is given] by fortune  

πρὸς 


for  

τὸ 


  

μακαρίως 


  

ζῆν 


  

ἀνθρώποις 


people [to live blissfully]  

δίδοσθαι, 


  

ἀρχὰς 


  

μέντοι 


but (instead that mere) starting-points  

μεγάλων 


(for) great  

ἀγαθῶν 


goods  

 


or  

κακῶν 


evils  

ὑπὸ 


  

ταύτης 


  

χορηγεῖσθαι· 


have been bestowed [by it]  

κρεῖττον 


  

εἶναι 


  

νομίζων 


believing [that it is better]  

εὐλογίστως 


  

ἀτυχεῖν 


to have bad luck [while reasoning well]  

 


than  

ἀλογίστως 


  

εὐτυχεῖν· 


to have good luck [while reasoning poorly]  

βέλτιον 


  

γὰρ 


because (it is) [better]  

ἐν 


  

ταῖς 


  

πράξεσι 


  

τὸ 


  

καλῶς 


  

κριθὲν 


(for) what has been judged [well]  

<μὴ 


  

ὀρθωθῆναι 


to [not] turn out right [in practice]  

 


than  

τὸ 


  

μὴ 


  

καλῶς 


  

κριθὲν> 


(for) what has [not] been judged [well]  

ὀρθωθῆναι 


to turn out right  

διὰ 


  

ταύτην. 


(by chance)  

[edit] Translation

Who could conceivably be better off than one who reveres the gods, who is utterly unafraid of death, and who has discovered the natural goal of life? Or one who understands that pleasure, the greatest good, is easily supplied to absolute fullness, while pain, the greatest evil, lasts only a moment when intense and is easily tolerated when prolonged? Or one who scoffs at fate, which is believed by some to be the mistress of all?

Such a man is better off than all, because he knows that the greater power of decision lies within oneself. He understands that while some things are indeed caused by fate, other things happen by chance or by choice. He sees that fate is irreproachable and chance unreliable, but choices deserve either praise or blame because what is decided by choice is not subject to any external power.

One would be better off believing in the myths about the gods than to be enslaved by the determinism proclaimed by certain physicists. At least the myths offer hope of winning divine favors through prayer, but fate can never be appealed.

One who is wise knows fortune is not god, as many believe, because the gods do not act randomly. Nor does he believe that everything is randomly caused. Nor does he believe that chance doles out good or evil for the sake of human happiness. He would actually prefer to suffer setbacks while acting wisely than to have miraculous luck while acting foolishly; for it would be better that well-planned actions should perchance fail than ill-planned actions should perchance succeed.

[edit] Analysis

Epicurus' buttresses all the previous assertions with a series of rhetorical questions, outlining the qualities of the one who has espoused Epicurean enlightenment. The "best person" exhibits

  • correct beliefs regarding divinity,
  • constant fearlessness towards death --the Greek expression dia pantos means "once and for all"-- and
  • a rational understanding of the "goals of nature", or "natural goals", i.e. that what is good is easy to acquire, and that what is painful is brief.

Unlike others, such a person "laughs at Fate", which some consider a goddess and master of everything that ever happens, and assumes responsibility for his/her own actions. Here Epicurus embarks on a complex and comprehensive syllogism:

What happens, happens by

  • necessity
  • chance, or
  • human agency

but

  • one cannot possibly assume any responsibility for submitting to necessity,
  • fortune is fickle, hard to discern, and thus cannot be relied upon, while
  • we are free to make our own good or bad choices, deserving laud or blame respectively.

What hoi polloi call Fate, argues Epicurus, is entirely false. Fate is not a god worthy of the name, because god does not act in a haphazard manner, nor is it some other "uncertain cause" behind the workings of the world. Refining this last criticism, Epicurus offers practically nuanced advice: chance/fortune is not the giver or taker of the good things in life that lead to happiness; it is rather a point of departure, from which one ought to start one's own deliberations towards that end-goal. In fact, argues Epicurus, it is ironically better to have made prudent plans that, due to unforeseen circumstances, did not work out as hoped for, than to have made imprudent, poorly thought-out plans that did work out well thanks to dumb luck. On a deeper level, that is undeniably true: the human qualities that led to these respective choices far overshadow their opposite outcomes.

EDITORIAL NOTES:

  • The first full sentence (ending with bracheis) is a rhetorical question; the Greek question mark is the same symbol as the English semicolon.
  • It is commonly (and reasonably) surmised that, when Epicurus advises his followers not "to be enslaved to the fate ton physikon", he means not simply (and nonsensically) "natural" people, but the Natural Philosophers, whose world-view was deterministic and fate-driven. Epicurus' point is that, while the enlightened materialism he advocates leads to the optimal lifestyle, not all alternatives are equally bad: one would rather live as a believing follower of the various myths about the gods, who can be appeased by appropriate conduct, than as helpless subject of the inexorable Fate that the Natural Philosophers believed in.
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