Principal Doctrine 38

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Ἔνθα 


Whenever  

μὴ 


  

καινῶν 


  

γενομένων 


  

τῶν 


  

περιεστώτων 


surrounding  

πραγμάτων 


things [not having become new]  

ἀνεφάνη 


[what has been considered just] appeared  

μὴ 


not  

ἁρμόττοντα 


fitting  

εἰς 


  

τὴν 


the  

πρόληψιν 


preconception (of justice)  

τὰ 


  

νομισθέντα 


  

δίκαια 


  

ἐπ’ 


in  

αὐτῶν 


  

ἔργων, 


practice  

οὐκ 


  

ἦν 


(it) would [not] be  

ταῦτα 


  

δίκαια. 


just  

ἔνθα 


Whenever  

δὲ 


on the other hand  

καινῶν 


  

γενομένων 


  

τῶν 


  

πραγμάτων 


  

οὐκ 


  

ἔτι 


  

συνέφερε 


it was [no longer] beneficial  

τὰ 


(for) the  

αὐτὰ 


same (things)  

δίκαια 


(to be considered) just  

κείμενα, 


as they are  

ἐνταῦθα 


in that case  

δὲ 


  

τότε 


then  

μὲν 


  

ἦν 


(something) was  

δίκαια, 


just  

ὅτε 


when  

συνέφερεν 


it was beneficial  

εἰς 


to  

τὴν 


the  

πρὸς 


  

ἀλλήλους 


mutual  

κοινωνίαν 


association  

τῶν 


  

συμπολιτευομένων· 


of fellow-citizens  

ὕστερον 


  

δ’ 


while [afterwards]  

οὐκ 


  

ἦν 


(it) was  

ἔτι 


[no] longer  

δίκαια, 


just  

ὅτε 


when  

μὴ 


  

συνέφερεν. 


it was [not] beneficial  

Translation

Where, without any change in circumstances, things held to be just by law are revealed to be in conflict with the essence of justice, such laws were never really just. But wherever or whenever laws have ceased to be advantageous because of a change in circumstances, in that case or time the laws were just when they benefited human interaction, and ceased to be just only when they were no longer beneficial.

Analysis

Not only does people's sense of what is and what is not just vary according to geographical location (and, of course, its attendant cultural differences), as Epicurus had stated in Principal Doctrine 36; it also changes in time. Change may happen in one of two possible scenarios:

A. Assuming ceteris paribus, i.e. that circumstances have not changed, that "things around have not become new":

This makes an important, although implicit distinction: most plausibly, Epicurus means to differentiate between a particular case where what is and what is not just is questioned, and our general (i.e. "proleptic") understanding of justice altogether, i.e. the preconception of justice as based on the fundamental principle of neither harming nor being harmed by others.

  • In such a case, the particular law that has been found to no longer fit our general preconception of justice is not just after all.

This probably alludes to those cases where, on second thought (i.e. and not due to a change in circumstances), it is revealed that e.g. a law that was passed earlier was not well thought out to begin with, has been seen to work poorly in practice, and thus ought to be amended or repealed.

B. Assuming, au contraire, that circumstances have in fact changed:

  • Some laws may then be found to no longer be beneficial; they are thus no longer just.
  • Yet they once were just, while they were still beneficial to "the association of fellow-citizens"; they ceased to be just when they ceased to be beneficial.

This latter scenario alludes to those cases where a law that was originally just in the context of some earlier circumstances, has been rendered obsolete, irrelevant, or simply unjust due to new, different circumstances.

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