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Epicurus listed justice among the virtues, whose value he understood (like that of all other virtues) as instrumental to human happiness. Justice is, perhaps, the perfect example in support of Epicurus' belief that virtue is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for ataraxia (Cf. Principal Doctrine 5).

If one commits an injustice, argued Epicurus, one must inevitably experience some anxiety about getting caught, fined, or imprisoned (Cf. Principal Doctrine 34, Principal Doctrine 35); if, on the contrary, one has done nothing wrong, one cannot help but experience ataraxia "automatically", having nothing to hide or worry about (Cf. Principal Doctrine 17).

On the level of society, Epicureans took what might be termed an evolutionary approach to justice: they understood it as having risen from some sort of primeval covenants between primitive tribesmen to neither harm, nor be harmed by each other; with time, this gave rise to the complex system of legal, contractual, and consensual obligations that define our modern concept of justice.

In general, ancient Greeks discussed justice (and much else) with the individual in mind; theirs were fundamentally agent-driven philosophies. With the Romans, and their considerable interests and accomplishments in the legal field (e.g. the first Codex), justice gradually began to be discussed with institutions (e.g. legislative, judiciary, etc.) in mind, from which stem many of our present-day institutional structures. We have no knowledge of what the Epicurean answers to such pressing questions as attend institutional justice might be.

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