Morality

The Epicurean notion of morality is both logical and practical; nevertheless, it has been widely misunderstood.

Epicurus taught that it is simply unwise to do anything that common sense, generally accepted public morality (what we might call the "most reasonable people" clause in Common Law) would term "wrong", such as e.g. stealing. In this, of course, he was in obvious alignment with all philosophical schools, both of his time and beyond.

Yet what scandalized Epicurus' philosophical rivals was the reasoning he offered behind his recommendation against such wrong-doing: it is not, he argued, that there is some "external" (e.g. god-given), absolute decree against stealing; there are no Commandments, and no "thou shalt not" injunctions. As could be expected, this raised furious objections and condemnations from adherents of other philosophical schools.

Epicurean morality, however, rounds off the argument with eminent logic, practicality, and psychological acuity: if you steal, you may get caught, and thereby suffer greater pain (e.g. incarceration) than the pleasure you would have putatively enjoyed thanks to the proceeds of the theft; and even if you don't get caught at present, you will still harbor anxiety at the possibility of getting caught in the future (ditto).

Lucretius paints a vivid image of one tormented by such thoughts, his everyday happiness poisoned by the anxiety over a (perhaps single) misdeed, perhaps even blurting self-incriminating evidence in his sleep, in delirious nightmares of guilt and apprehension. Even discounting all poetic license, the message is as simple as it is convincing: crime does not pay.

The benefit-side of this classic, Epicurean cost/benefit analysis is just as logical and psychologically to the point: if one has not stolen anything to begin with, one has absolutely no reason to agonize over getting caught for stealing; as far as this particular item is concerned, one has won ataraxia, which vastly outvalues any other benefit to human happiness. Case closed.